Health secretaries failed to fix flaws in contingency planning before Covid killed more than 230,000 in UK, report says
The former health secretaries Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock have been criticised for their failure to better prepare the UK for the pandemic in a damning first report from the Covid inquiry that calls for a major overhaul in how the government prepares for civil emergencies.
Hunt, who was the health secretary from 2012-18, and Hancock, who took over until 2021, were named by the chair to the inquiry, Heather Hallett, for failing to rectify flaws in contingency planning ahead of the pandemic, which claimed more than 230,000 lives in the UK.
The leader or deputy leader of each of the four nations should chair a cabinet-level committee responsible for civil emergency preparedness.
A UK-wide pandemic response exercise should be run at least every three years and a new UK-wide, whole-system civil emergency strategy be put in place.
External “red teams” should regularly challenge the principles, evidence and advice on emergency plans.
An independent statutory body should be established to advise the UK government and devolved administrations, and consult with voluntary groups and council-based directors of public health on civil emergency preparedness and response.
The UK being prepared for the wrong pandemic: influenza. When Hancock became health secretary in July 2018 his day one briefing said: “Pandemic flu is the government’s highest risk”.
The institutions responsible for emergency planning being “labyrinthine in their complexity”.
The government’s sole pandemic strategy (for flu) being outdated – it was from 2011 – and lacking adaptability.
A failure to appreciate the impact of the pandemic and the response to it on ethnic minority communities, and people in poor health and with other vulnerabilities.
A failure to learn from earlier civil emergency exercises and disease outbreaks.
A “damaging absence of focus” on systems such as test, trace and isolate that could be scaled up.
A lack of adequate leadership in the preceding years, with ministers, untrained in civil contingencies, not being presented with a broad range of scientific opinion. They also failed to sufficiently challenge the advice they got, which in any event was beset by “groupthink”.